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We thank Parag Waknis for his comment. If nothing else, it succeeds – albeit unintention-
ally – in providing a fi ne illustration of 
the problems with contemporary eco-
nomics that our article described.
In our article, we suggested that the 
methodology that has dominated eco-
no mics for the last generation leaves 
economists unequipped to make argu-
ments for active macroeconomic policy. 
Since agents know the true parameters 
of the distribution of future outcomes 
and inter-temporally optimise at all 
points based on that, the link between 
current income and current expendi-
ture, and the consequent centrality of 
aggregate demand are broken. The 
result of this approach is that recessions 
and periods of high unemployment are 
simply assumed to be the result of opti-
mising choices on the part of agents. 
Waknis does not challenge the accuracy 
of this description of current economic 
practice; he just does not see anything 
wrong with it. 
Sleight of Hand
Waknis employs a common rhetorical 
sleight of hand, confl ating the undisputed 
importance of expectations and profi t-
seeking behaviour, with one specifi c 
approach to them. Economists have 
always been interested in how people 
make choices, and analysis of aggre-
gates has always incorporated stories 
about the individual behaviour underly-
ing them. What is new to the modern 
consensus is the idea that the only legit-
imate way to handle expectations is to 
assume that all economic actors know 
the true probability distribution of all 
possible future events. When people 
like Waknis say that we must think 
about expectations, what they really 
mean is that we must not think about 
what happens when expectations are 
distorted or differ between actors, 
or about the concrete process through 
which expectations are formed.
However much this approach mono-
polises the textbooks, it is not useful for 
describing real world booms, cycles and 
crises, as Waknis himself inadvertently 
demonstrates. In the paragraph im-
mediately following his lecture urging 
“faith in people’s ability to make choices”, 
he announces that investors in Europe 
made consistently wrong choices about 
the riskiness of public debt! Waknis 
may be right that southern European 
public debt was systematically mis-
priced, but it is logically incompatible 
with the models economists use to think 
about government budgets, which as-
sume that fi nancial market participants 
know the true expected values of gov-
ernment spending and taxing across all 
future time.
Turning to questions of policy, it ap-
pears that Waknis does not understand 
what a multiplier is. He notes a range of 
multiplier estimates around one, and 
takes this to mean that increased public 
borrowing crowds out an equal quantity 
of private spending. But as anyone 
who has sat through an undergraduate 
macroecono mics course should know, 
what the multiplier measures is the 
ratio of the change in total output to the 
change in government output. So with a 
multiplier of one, there is no crowding 
out; government spending increases 
real output dollar for dollar. Under 
today’s conditions, most empirical econ-
omists prefer estimates at the high end 
of Waknis’ range; the chief economist of 
the International Monetary Fund recently 
suggested a typical value “substantially 
greater than one” (Blanchard and Leigh 
2013). But even lower values still mean 
that higher government spending will 
raise output and reduce unemployment. 
Waknis thinks he is bringing these 
estimates up as arguments for austerity, 
but he is really offering testimony for 
the other side. His confusion on this 
elementary point suggests a harsher 
judgment on the state of econo mics than 
anything in our original article.
Waknis’ inability to grasp the role of 
 aggregate demand is striking, but sadly 
not unusual. It leads naturally to the 
claim that high unemployment, espe-
cially in Europe, is due to overgenerous 
benefi ts to those out of work. There is 
an immense empirical literature on this 
claim, which fi nds the evidence for it 
somewhere between weak and non-
existent (Howell et al 2007). Indeed, 
the countries with the highest and 
most comprehensive unemployment 
benefi ts (Norway and Denmark) have 
substantially lower unemployment than 
the US (OECD 2013). The argument 
also fails the test of common sense. 
 Today, unemployment in the European 
Union (EU) is about fi ve points higher 
than in the US. But as recently as the 
fall of 2009, US and EU unemployment 
rates were identical. Surely the European 
welfare state is not a fresh creation of 
the past four years? More fundamen-
tally, if the rise in unemployment is 
due to declining “incentives to work”, it 
follows that newly unemployed prefer 
their current state of leisure to the jobs 
they had before. Waknis ends his letter 
with a call for continued research. 
One useful contribution he might make 
is intervie wing unemployed workers, 
and asking them how they are enjoying 
the vacations they have chosen. We 
 expect he will fi nd the answers most 
stimulating.
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